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Making Pensions Work
Summary
The UK has a pension crisis. Lots of supposed explanations and excuses have been offered. Thegeneral assumption is that it is state pensions that are the cause of our problems. This reportchallenges that assumption. It shows that the problem in the UK’s pension system is not to be foundin the state sector, but within our private pension funds.
Using data for the most recent year available – 2007/08 – it shows that total pensions paid in thatyear amounted to £117.6 billion. Of this sum £57.6 billion was state old aged pensions, £25 billionwas state employment related pensions paid to former civil servants and other former publicemployees and £35 billion was private sector pension payments.
In the same year the total cost of subsidies to the private UK pension industry through tax andnational insurance reliefs on contributions made and from the tax exemption of income of pensionfunds amounted to £37.6 billion. The result was that, albeit indirectly, the entire cost of privatesector pensions paid in 2007/08 was covered by tax reliefs given to the private sector pension fundsthat paid them. To put it another way, every single penny of the cost of UK pension payments in2007/08 was in effect paid by the UK government.
Understanding this quite shocking fact changes two debates. The first is the pension debate and thesecond is the debate on the future of state spending in the UK. It’s important to stress both points.
A pension subsidy of about £38 billion represents approximately 25% of the UK government’scurrent annual fiscal deficit, 7% of government income and 5.5% of government spending ifrepeated in the current financial year. To put it in context, this subsidy for private pensions is almostexactly the same as the current UK defence budget. This makes the subsidy given to our pensionindustry one of the biggest items of state spending in the UK. And yet, to date, no one has asked if itis justified, or well spent, or should continue. In an environment where cuts are being threatened foralmost all state spending this is an extraordinary situation.
It is all the more surprising when it is realised that from 1998/99 to 2008/09 pension subsidies to theUK private pension sector cost the UK government £300 billioni. To put this in context, in March2009 total UK government borrowing was £617 billion. In other words, almost half of all UKgovernment debt at the end of 2008/09 had arisen solely because of subsidies given to privatepensions over the previous decade.  Understanding this changes the deficit debate and yet it hasentirely avoided discussion to dateii.
Simple consideration of these facts leads to the obvious conclusion that the current direction of UKpension reform is wrong. That reform, proposed by Lord Turner and legislated by the last Labourgovernment assumed a world of ongoing economic growth and ever rising stock markets. From 2013
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onwards the 56% of people in the UK who currently do not save for a pension will be heavilyencouraged to do so through the NEST contributory defined pension scheme that is scheduled to beintroduced from that year, with full implementation in 2016. Contributions will amount to 8% of anemployees pay – which some have suggested as unaffordable as the state pensions the system ismeant to supplement.
It is our suggestion that this scheme is unaffordable because it ignores the fundamental pensioncontract that should exist within any society. This is that one generation, the older one, will throughits own efforts create capital assets and infrastructure in both the state and private sectors whichthe following younger generation can use in the course of their work. In exchange for theirsubsequent use of these assets for their own benefit that succeeding younger generation will, ineffect, meet the income needs of the older generation when they are in retirement. Unless thisfundamental compact that underpins all pensions is honoured any pension system will fail.
This compact is ignored in the existing pension system that does not even recognise that it exists.Our state subsidised saving for pensions makes no link between that activity and the necessaryinvestment in new capital goods, infrastructure, job creation and skills that we need as a country. Asa result state subsidy is being given with no return to the state appearing to arise as a consequence,precisely because this is a subsidy for saving which does not generate any new wealth. This is thefundamental economic problem and malaise in our current pension arrangement.
In this paper we set out our evidence that demonstrates the inadequacy of the performance ofcurrent private pension funds and we show as a result how misguided it would be to base the futurewell being of the elderly population of this country on this failed model of pension provision. We do,however, go further by offering recommendations for radical reform of our pension system.
Most importantly we suggest that if those pension funds are to attract tax relief in future they mustuse a significant part of the £80 billion of contributions they receive each year to invest in new jobs,new technology and new infrastructure for the UK so that the wealth that is needed to grow oureconomy, to create jobs and to build the real capital base that must be passed to the nextgeneration is built on the back of pension fund investment.
Next we suggest radical improvements in the transparency of pension funds so that all pensioninvestors can hold them to account for the use of the money entrusted to their care – somethingthat is impossible to do at present.
Thirdly, we recommend that current pension deficits in final salary schemes be cleared whereverpossible by the issue of new shares in the companies responsible for those funds. This would stopthe current fruitless drainage of cash out of companies that should be used for real investment andwhich is instead directed via pension funds into the stock market to buy shares in other companies,the only benefit of which is to create a spiral of stock exchange boom and bust. We also suggest thatfuture contributions to such final salary pension schemes might also be paid, at least in part, byissuing new shares in the companies responsible for those final salary pension schemes. This would
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free cash within those companies for real investment in real products and services that createwealth in the UK economy. The benefit of that investment in new products and services would thenbe shared with the people working in those companies as a result of the mutualisation of theirownership via their pension funds.
Lastly we recommend that if enforced saving is to be required by the government then thatgovernment has a duty to ensure that the funds so saved are invested for the common good.Pension fund performance over the last decade has a been a history of almost perpetual loss makingdespite the enormous subsidies that pension fund tax relief has provided to the City of London andstock markets, all of which they have frittered away. Investment in local authority bonds for localregeneration, or in bonds or shares issued by a new Green Investment Bank and in hypothecatedbonds e.g. to provide alternative funding to replace the inefficiently expensive Private FinanceInitiative for funding public sector infrastructure projects would have prevented those losses –because all of these would have paid positive returns to pension fund investors. It is for exactly thisreason that we recommend that such assets be the basis for any new state pension fund in thefuture.
The impact of our proposals would be significant. At least £20 billion a year would be released intothe UK economy for new investment.
People would understand what their pension funds were doing, and could hold them to account forit.
State subsidies to pension funds would produce real economic returns for the government.
And the incentive to save in pensions would be real – because people would see the benefits ofdoing so for their immediate well being, for their own future income and for the benefit of theirchildren.
To date pension funds have been an almost perfect example of what Keynes described as ‘theparadox of thrift’ – saving that sucked demand and well being out of the economy. We needsomething very different now. We need pension funds that can build economic will being for thepresent and the future. The recommendations in this report show that sensible reform of pensionfunds and the tax subsidies they enjoy could make pension funds the engine for economicregeneration in the UK. No reform is of greater importance than that.
The proposals this paper makes are an economically viable, economically reasoned, and ethicallymotivated solution to one of the biggest problems facing our society in the long term whichhappens, fortuitously, to provide almost immediate short term benefits for all involved.
Richard MurphyFinance for the Future LLPSeptember 2010
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Making Pensions Work
1. The conventional view – pensions are a problem, with costlyconsequences
The UK is reported to have a massive pension problem. It has a booming population of people ofretirement ageiii. Its private sector pension funds are in parlous shapeiv. Its state funded pensions aresupposedly unaffordablev. Its population has not, it is said, saved sufficiently to fund their old agevi.The consequence is that the age of retirement is increasing – to 66 soon, with the upward trend tocontinue. This will cut the cost of paying state old age pensions. In addition, from 2013 onwards the56% of people who currently do not save for a pensionvii will be heavily encouraged to do so throughthe NEST contributory defined pension scheme that is scheduled to be introduced from that year,with full implementation in 2016viii. Contributions will amount to 8% of an employees pay – whichsome have suggested as unaffordable as the state pensions the system is meant to supplementix.
2. Claims made about the crisis
Some of the reasons for the current crisis in pension provision in the UK are inherent in thedefinition of the problem noted above. Most especially, people are living longer and the trendappears to be ongoing, at least for the time beingx. And there is, whether by political choice or not,significant pressure on the funds available to pay state pensionsxi.
But these are not the only reasons given by many for the crisis we now have. Others are offered,including the collapse in confidence in private pensions following the failure of Equitable Life and therefusal of the last Labour government to pay significant compensation as resultxii. The misspelling ofpersonal pensions in the 1980s and early 1990s did not help eitherxiii. But most especially, the changein the tax laws Labour introduced in 1997 so that the tax credit on pensions received by pensionfunds was eliminated, reducing the income of funds by about £5 billion a year at the time, has beenblamed extensively by Conservative politicians and their allies for the sorry state of private pensionfunds ever since that timexiv. In particular, some suggest that this is the reason for wide scale closureof final salary pension.
3. Better explanations of the crisis
The reality is whilst that the cost of an aging population is a reason for the pension problem, mostother explanations noted above (and others offered elsewhere, not noted here) are at best partialexplanations of the problems we face.
Of course it did not help confidence in the pension system that so many people were mis-soldpensions under plans promoted by Conservative governments in the 1980s. And of course it did not
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help that a major and trusted pension company failed so many pensioners with the governmentrefusing to accept some responsibility for the issue. It is, however, too simplistic to blame the issuesolely on such causes.
It is also completely misleading to blame a change in tax law for the collapse of final salary pensionschemes. Alex Brummer in his book ‘The Great pensions Robbery’ claims (page 65) that the impactof this change cost the industry about £100 billion in the first decade it had effect, but in 2010pension fund investments amounted to more than £900 billionxv and annual contributions exceeded£80 billionxvi. The impact of the tax change was undoubtedly a loss to pension funds, but the realityis that it was not of the scale indicated by those who have sought to create political capital from itand that change in the law could not have created the current pension crisis.
There are other real issues that have contributed more to the crisis but which have gone largelyunnoticed. One has been increasing house prices meaning many people have been forced to investin their property and not in their long term future. This graphxvii shows the trend in house pricesquite dramatically, the term ‘expon’ relating to the ‘exponential’ or average trend over time:
This next graph, also from the Nationwide Building Society, shows the ratio of UK house prices toaverage earnings, and explains the resulting misallocation of savings resources to domestic housing:
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Cash has, perforce, been saved by many in land and buildings, not pension funds.
Many have, however, thought this savings decision, to reject pension funds in favour of land andbuildings a rational choice. As data published by the organisation promoting the City of London,TheCityUK, showsxviii, the ten year rate of return on investment in UK stock markets was an averageloss of 2% per annum over the first decade of the twenty first century. This was also the globalaverage rate of return on shares in that decade. The US market did worse, averaging a loss of 3% perannum over the decade and yet pension funds resolutely stuck to share based investments wheninvesting on behalf of their members, as this graph of trends in UK pension fund investments overthe period shows:
Source: National Statisticsxix
Around 60% of pension assets are still saved in corporate securities, the only notable change of latebeing a shift from shareholding to private sector bondholding within this category. Governmentbonds are, of course, part of public sector securities.
The persistent purchase of shares by pension funds when the market was paying no return cannothave encouraged potential savers to entrust their assets to pension fund managers, and this has nodoubt contributed to the low pension savings rate the UK has witnessed.
It also undoubtedly contributed to the deficits those pension funds suffered. Whilst the sums theycontrol appear vast, amounting to £915bn in March 2010 according to the Pension Protection Fundxxthe liabilities they owed at that date were of equal amount, and it was to very large degree pure luckthat this equation balanced at that time since this was a massive improvement on the situation a
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year before when the stock market crash meant there had been a 22% overall deficit in the UK’spensions funds – totaling £242 bn in all. Such volatility has not inspired confidence, and there is noreason why it should in future.
4. Tackling the real causes of the crisis
Important as these issues are though, this briefing shows that whilst there is some relevance tothese better explanations for the crisis they too cannot explain the dilemma we face. That is becausethe UK’s pension problem is, we argue, quite different from that which is conventionally diagnosedbased on these facts. Our alternative view is that the UK’s pension problem is that far from the statesector pension being the cause of all our current problems and the private sector being the solutionto our pension dilemma it is, in fact the private sector pensions that have failed to deliver to date,and that without the state we would already be deep in a pension crisis.
This argument is backed by facts. Based on data from HM Revenue & Customs, Office for NationalStatistics and the pension industry in 2007/08 – the last year for which comprehensive data isavailable - total pensions paid in the UK amounted to £117.6 billion. Of this sum £57.6 billion wasstate old aged pensions; £25 billion was state employment related pensions paid to former civilservants and other former public employees and £35 billion was private sector pension payments.Full data is supplied in appendix 1 to this report.  The consequence of this is that £82.6 billion of thiscost arose directly to the UK government and the balance, apparently, to private pension funds.
5. All pensions in the UK are being paid at direct cost to the UKgovernment
However, the situation is more complex than that. As we also show in appendix 1, the cost of statesubsidies for pensions in the same year, 2007/08 amounted to £37.6 billion. In other words, theentire cost of all supposedly ‘private’ pension scheme payments made in that year also fell on the UKgovernment as well. What that means is that all pension payments in the UK in that year were madeat direct cost to the UK government and none at all, in effect, at cost to the private sector pensionindustry.
Of course the link is not direct: the subsidies given to companies and individuals to encourage themto make contributions to pension funds and the direct subsidies the pension funds receivedthemselves, either on contributions paid to them or by receiving their income tax free, were notdirectly tied to the pensions those funds in turn paid out. We also know that notionally some of thetax relief given to employees on pension contributions goes to those who appear to contribute tostate ‘pay as you go’ pensions schemes – but only because they have to enjoy a comparable relief tothat which goes to those making contribution to private sector funds to ensure that the latterappear attractive savings mechanisms. The result is that even this subsidy effectively supports thoseprivate sector funds.
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With these points being noted, we argue that what the data we present shows is that without thesesubsidies to those making contributions and those direct subsidies paid to the funds themselvesthen the position of those funds and their capacity to make pension payments would have beenseverely, if not completely undermined. In other words those funds do, directly or indirectly enjoythe entire eventual benefit of the tax subsidies that we summarise in this paper, and in that case theentire pension income that private pension funds paid out in 2007/08 was covered by subsidies theyreceived, directly or indirectly from the UK government.
6. Should private pensions get £38 billion of government subsidy a year?
Appreciating these facts completely changes the pension debate as well as the current debate onthe use of government funds in the light of the current fiscal deficit that the UK government faces.After all, this subsidy is, in effect state spending by any other name and yet it appears to have beencompletely excluded from the cuts debate.
A pension subsidy of about £38 billion represents approximately 25% of the UK government’scurrent annual fiscal deficit, 7% of government income and 5.5% of government spending ifrepeated in the current financial year. To put it in context, this subsidy for private pensions is almostexactly the same as the current UK defence budget. This is no small sum when cuts are beingconsidered and yet it is one that has entirely avoided debatexxi. It has to be asked whether such sumcan be justified.
7. What are private pension funds doing?
In the light of this evidence it becomes reasonable to ask what private pension funds are actuallydoing to justify the subsidy they receive when it seems that they are largely ineffective at deliveringpensions to their members without the cost of doing so being covered by a subsidy from the state.This is, of course, a completely different question from that asked by all pension enquiries to date,which have assumed that the private sector can deliver pensions and that the state sector cannot,evidence that our data now challenges.
To put it another way, how can an industry that has £80 billion or so of money invested in it eachyear apparently require an enormous state subsidy to ensure it pays a return? We suggest that thereare two core reasons for this failure of private pension funds to deliver for their members and theUK government.
First, the mismanagement of the investments they hold has been of extraordinary scale whencompared to the obligations such funds have to meet. For example, in February 2010 BT Group Plcrevealed it had a £9bn pension deficit when at the time it had a market capitalization of about £10bnxxii. In effect this company is being swamped by its pension liabilities. The chance that companyhas of being able to innovate its way out of this situation by making new investments is remote inthe extreme: the demand on its cash flow to fund pension obligations denies it that opportunity.
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This though is the ‘micro’ perspective of the problem. Adopting the alternative ‘macro perspectiveoffers the second reason for private sector pension fund failure. This is the consequence of therebeing no obligation on those funds to invest in a way that creates new economic activity. As wasdemonstrated at the time of a previous pension crisisxxiii, 99% of all investment in corporate sharesand bonds made by pension funds is in what might best be called “second hand” shares or bondsalready in issue. The purchase or sale of such shares or bonds provides the issuing companiesnominally responsible for these assets with no direct benefit at all from their purchase. It was ofcourse true that when first issued such shares and bonds would have provided funds to the companythat issued them, and whose name they bear, but thereafter whenever they are bought and sold –as they are day in, day out by pension funds – not one penny of the money traded goes to thebenefit of that company. Instead all of it goes to the previous owner of the share or bond inquestion. That may be a pension fund, of course, but the point is that none of this speculativeactivity does in any way benefit the productive economy. As such a pension funds purchase of theseassets creates no new investment or employment opportunities. In economic terms these pensionfund “investments” are, therefore, savings activities and not investment activities.
In contrast only about £100bn, or about 12% at most, of pension fund holdings are in governmentsecurities. This represents a considerable investment portfolio imbalance which fails to reflect theproportionate roles the state and private sectors each play in the economy when the state as awhole accounts for more than 40% of GDP.
This investment profile has, we argue, enormous impact at this time of economic crisis. In effectpension savings are currently receiving a state subsidy to suck demand out of the economy – whereit is needed to boost economic activity – so that the cash in question can be placed into savings -where no productive activity results. Pension saving is, therefore, at this moment, increasing therecessionary cycle, and not decreasing it.
The result is that the enormous and unquestioned tax subsidy that our pension industry is receivingis at this moment depressing our economy when that is the last thing we need to happen.
8. Inadequate reform
Faced with a problem of this scale the currently proposed pension reforms for the UK, based on theTurner Report of 2005, which was written against a background belief that a booming economycould last forever, appear hopelessly outdated.
Those proposals require that all employees make payment into a funded pension scheme. Theywould, of course, enjoy tax relief when doing so, but the pension funds in question would, it wasthen assumed be saved as have all private sector pensions funds to date, in the ways noted above.Importantly, Lord Turner did not place obligation on the managers of these funds to actually use thefunds entrusted to their care to regenerate the economy by being invested in new economic activityrather than being used for speculative purpose. This was a major omission in his report, revealingthe inadequacy of its fundamental economic analysis.
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9. The fundamental pension contract
This is, in the light of the evidence noted above, the wrong direction for reform. The reform ofpensions required at this time must be based upon recognition of the fundamental pension contractthat exists within any society. This is that one generation, the older one, will through its own effortscreate capital assets and infrastructure in both the state and private sectors which the followingyounger generation can use in the course of their work. In exchange for their subsequent use ofthese assets for their own benefit that succeeding younger generation will, in effect, meet theincome needs of the older generation when they are in retirement. Unless this fundamentalcompact that underpins all pensions is honoured any pension system will fail.
This compact is ignored in the existing pension system. Indeed, the current pension system does noteven recognise that it exists. Whilst state subsidised saving for pensions is undoubtedly taking placethere is no link between that activity and necessary investment in new capital goods, infrastructure,job creation and skills. As a result state subsidy is being given with no return to the state appearingto arise as a consequence, precisely because this is a subsidy for saving which does not generate anynew wealth. This is the fundamental economic problem and malaise in our current pensionarrangement.
In the meantime, and as importantly, a massive but unproductive industry in managing pensionsfunds has been created, which enormously reallocates wealth to the City of London but whichappears unable to pay any adequate pension returns.
10.The economic consequence of pension failure
This whole arrangement has enormous cost to society at large. At a time of recession this isespecially important: the current pension industry reinforces what Keynes called the paradox ofthriftxxiv, draining enormous sums out of the economy and into saving (but not then on intoinvestment) at a time when a redirection of the flow is needed i.e. money needs to go into theeconomy to create investment, jobs and future well being which can underpin future pensions.
A redirection of this flow, so that pension savings are transformed into pension investments is thenecessary economic basis for pension reform.
11.The reforms that are needed
Seven reforms are needed.
Firstly, the state has to guarantee an old age pension that keeps all older people in this country outof poverty irrespective of their fortunes during their working life, their gender and their relationship
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status. This means a commitment to increasing the basic pension and enhancing pension credits isessential.
Second, if tax relief is to be given to pension fund contributions then there must be conditionsattached to doing so. To secure this tax relief in future we recommend that a significant part ofthose pension fund contributions (we suggest at least 25% of them, and maybe more) must beinvested in new economic activity and not in the buying and selling of shares and bonds whichprovide no new money for the real economy. This means pension funds must be proactively used tocreate new capital assets, infrastructure, skills and job. In addition, pension funds must be requiredto invest for the long term and to minimise the transaction costs at present paid every time a stockor bond is bought or sold. This means that funds should be required by law to invest strategically asbusiness partners and not speculatively for short term gain, a role that is in any case and inevitablyin conflict with their long term duty to produce returns for their members. Of course, we accept thatsome pension funds will not want to invest in the way we recommend. They must be allowed thatchoice so long as they clearly understand the corollary that there would be no tax relief for thosechoosing to invest in them.
Thirdly, the process of pension fund saving must be seen to be invested in the inter-generationalpension contract explained above. To ensure that this is the case pension funds must be accountableto those who either voluntarily or compulsorily save for their old age through a pension fund. Assuch pension funds must be required to produce accounts that are comprehensible to a lay person,must supply them to all members, and must in those accounts detail their investment programmesand the opportunities those investment programmes have created in the areas where the membersthey serve live.
Fourth, in pursuit of these objectives pension funds must seek to undertake new forms ofinvestment. It is very obvious that the existing profile of their ‘investments’ (which are actuallysavings) carry inherent speculative risk which makes them unsuitable for long term pension savingpurposes whilst providing considerable opportunity for excessive charges to be made by the City ofLondon, which is contrary to fund member’s best interests. If pension funds were instead genuinelyinvested in local authority bonds for local regeneration, or in bonds or shares issued by a new GreenInvestment Bank and in hypothecated bonds e.g. to provide alternative funding to replace theinefficiently expensive Private Finance Initiative for funding public sector infrastructure projects thenthis situation would be changed, quite radically. What is more these alternative investments wouldnot only create jobs in the UK economy, they would also have life spans that will suit the needs ofmany pension fund managers and their members because the investments will earn revenue overperiods of up to twenty five years and more before returning capital when required by pensionfunds to provide annuities.
Fifthly, existing pension fund deficits need to be addressed to ensure members’ well being is not atrisk. The existing mechanism for doing so is to require the fund’s sponsoring corporation to injectmore cash which is then used to buy shares in other corporations. This, however, simply helpscreates a boom and bust cycle in share prices whilst denying cash to necessary investment in real
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business activity. In addition this pension topping up is treated as a cost by the sponsoring company,which depresses businesses earnings and tax revenues (through the additional tax relief that suchtopping up attracts), both being contrary to the best interest of the fund’s members. The obviousmechanism that will stop this destructive cycle of cash injections that never fill the apparent pensiondeficit, but which do boost City well being, requires the sponsoring company to issue its pensionfund with shares in itself to the value needed to eliminate the pension fund deficit. The pension fundwill then, of course, be allowed to issue these into the market over time, if it so wishes.
It is stressed that this will not be detrimental to the company. The shares issued to the pension fundwill clear the deficit in the pension fund – which would otherwise be shown as a liability in thecompany’s accounts. Under our proposal that liability is cleared and its capital is increased at thesame time. The company’s balance sheet is stronger as a result of this share issue. The value of theshares held by those holding shares before the pension deficit is cleared by the issue of new sharesto the pension fund should not be affected either: the new shares have a value exactly equivalent tothe liability cleared, so the company’s worth should have gone up by the value of the shares issued –leaving existing shareholders as they were, but for one thing, which is bound to leave them betteroff. That difference is that the company will now have free cash flow to invest in new opportunities –from which it would profit, instead of having to devote that cash to shoring up its pension fund in anever ending, and always failing, game of trying to beat the stock market.
As a result such a policy would provide the business that currently has a pension deficit with theessential cash it needs to invest in its own business to ensure it continues to grow and support jobswhilst clearing that deficit will not distort that company’s reported cash earnings, leaving thecompany vulnerable to takeover, and it will not reduce tax revenues, but it will at the same timerecognise the legitimate claim employee’s now have on the capital of their employers.
Sixthly, the method of paying future fund contributions has to be reconsidered. Of course cash is onemechanism for making such contributions, but active consideration should be given to payment ofcontributions by employers in kind by issue of new shares in their companies to their pension funds,which would then be at liberty to dispose of them, if they wished. Of course there are problems withany pension fund being too over-exposed to investment in the company that promotes it, as Enronproved, but subject to this caveat such a process ensures pensions can be funded without denyingcash to businesses that want to provide final salary pension schemes.
Finally, if the government is to require compulsory saving for old age then that saving should not bedirected towards the casino structure of the stock exchange but must instead be invested in stable,secure and predictable investments including government gilts and a mix of the new investmentsdescribed in the fourth recommendation, above. It is not the duty of the government to require thatany person compulsorily put their savings at risk. This requires a review of the structures proposedby Lord Turner before they are implemented with potentially serious consequences.
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12.The impact of the changes
The changes we propose would have a number of profound effects which would quickly becomeapparent within the real economy.
Firstly, a commitment to enhancing the state pension is part of the fabric of a good society.
Second, if pension funds are required to invest and not be used for speculative purchases ofpreviously issued shares and bonds then at least a significant part of the £80 billion of fundsentrusted to them each year would rapidly become the biggest source of new investment funding inthe UK, transforming their role and ensuring the biggest boost to investment in the economy forgenerations. We suggest that at least £20 billion a year will be made available for new investment inthe UK economy as a result of this change, transforming the role of our pension funds andtransforming the prospects for the UK economy at the same time.
Thirdly, making pension funds accountable through better reporting would remove one of thecurrent obstacles to pension investment, which is the current quite rational reaction to the fact thatfunds once committed are now almost wholly lost from view with no certain prospect of everproducing a return because of quite reasonable doubt many have about how the funds are beingused by the pension trustees. Pension fund accountability would, inevitably, transform pension fundbehaviour when at present they are almost entirely opaque.
Fourthly, if pension fund investment was better understood and some pension funds offered clearregional investment profiles so that those saving in them could know the funds they were puttingaside for their old age were being used in the meantime to create local jobs in the communities inwhich they lived then a current major objection to this form of saving – which is that the pensionsaver has no idea what is being done with their money - would be eliminated.
Fifthly, the widespread and rational feeling that pension fund savings are abused by the City whoprofit at expense of pension fund members will be brought to an end, because the change inpension fund objectives will bring that abuse to an end. This will help deflate the predominant roleof the City in society.
Sixthly, employee co-ownership of their business through their pension funds will become morecommonplace. This is now widely seen as a successful business model.
Seventh, government funding will be better targeted to ensure favourable, broadly based outcomesfor society rather than being focused on a restricted range of individuals enjoying pension premiumtax relief.
Finally, and hopefully, the return to pensioners should improve as succeeding generations receivefrom them the capital and infrastructure inheritance they need to ensure they can keep theirforebears in their old age.
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As such this is an economically viable, economically reasoned, and ethically motivated solution toone of the biggest problems facing our society in the long term which happens, fortuitously, toprovide almost immediate short term benefits for all involved.
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Appendix 1 – pension data for 2007 /08
In the financial year 2009/10 UK state pensions cost the Exchequer £66.8 billionxxv. In combinationthat was 54.1% of all administered by the Department for Work and Pensions (totaling £123.3billion)xxvi and amounted to almost exactly 10.0% of all government spendingxxvii and 4.8% of UKestimated GDPxxviii. The equivalent figure for old age pensions in 2007/08 was £57.6 bnxxix. Thishowever, is not the whole story when it comes to the cost to the state of pension provision. Whenthe full story is told the situation is much more complex.
To put this in context, in 2007/08 (the latest year for which comprehensive data is currentlyavailable) HM Revenue & Customs record that income from all “other pensions” (i.e. pensions otherthan state old age pensions) declared on tax returns amounted to £60 billionxxx. This figure issomewhat bigger than the figure calculated by National Statistics for total pension fund payments inthat year, which amounted to £35 billion (plus an additional £6 billion of very largely tax free lumpsum payments made on retirement  which are therefore not reflected on tax returns)xxxi.
The reconciliation between total “other” pension income of £60 billion and the sum paid by privatepension funds must, of course, be made up of the unfunded, pay as you go, state pensions paid as aresult of accrued employment rights. These arise, for example, for members of the civil service whowork for the state and who nominally contribute part of their salary to a pension fund as aconsequence, but where the state does not actually invest these funds but does instead use them topay the pensions of those already in retirement – hence the term ‘pay as you go’.  The total of thesepension payments, by deduction, amounted to approximately £25 billion in 2007/08. As a proportionof GDP this is 1.7%, a number confirmed to be correct by the National Audit Officexxxii.
A summary of pensions paid in 2007/08 is, therefore, as follows (within reasonable parameters ofcalculation):
Type of pension Sum paid £’bnState old age pensions 57.6Private sector pensions 35.0State employment relatedpensions 25.0Sub-total, pensions paid 117.6Private sector, lump sums 6.0Total pension returns, includinglump sums 123.6
Of this sum £82.6 billion appears to be paid directly by the state and £41 billion by the private sectorof which £6 billion is not treated as income for tax purposes.
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It may also be worth noting that National Statistics additionally calculated that pension funds spent£5 billion on administration and costs in 2007/08, bringing the total cost of paying taxable pensionsof £35 billion to £46 billion in the yearxxxiii.
It is then important to note that in the same year, 2007/08, the total sum paid by companies andindividuals into pension funds amounted to £83.1 billionxxxiv. The total tax relief given on thesecontributions cost HM Revenue & Customs £37.6 billion in the year in questionxxxv. This is made up asfollowsxxxvi:
2007-08Relief for £ billionsOccupational Scheme ContributionsBy Employees 4.4By Employers 13.2Personal Pension Scheme ContributionsBy Employees 2.1By Employers 2.0PP and RAC Contributions by self employed 1.3National Insurance rebates to PPs 0.1
Tax free investment income of funds 5.9Lump sum payments from unfunded schemes 0.4National Insurance relief on employercontributions 8.2
Total 37.6
As is clear from this data – a belief in private pensions as the basis for future provision looks forlornbecause even in their good years (which may now be over) they appear to have supplied only £35billion of ongoing pension payments (at most) out of a total of £117.6 billion of total pensionpayments, or less than one third of pension payments. And they did so at a total cost to the state forpension tax relief of £37.6 billion.
Putting this data together does suggest that the total cost to the state of paying pensions is:
Cost Sum paid £’bnState old age pensions 57.6State employment relatedpensions 25.0Cost of pension tax relief inaddition to the above 37.6Total 120.2
In other words, and allowing for inevitable rounding in all estimates of this sort and the fact thatthese ratios are bound to change a little from year to year, every single pension payment made in
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2007/08, totaling £117.6 billion in all (if lump sums are ignored) was made at eventual direct cost tothe UK government, even if not paid directly by it. The private sector did not, in effect, bear any ofthe burden in that year of paying pensions to members of private sector pension funds. Thoseprivate pensions were, in effect, paid entirely out of the state subsidies that the pension industry orthose making pension contributions (whether as employer or as employee) received, directly orindirectly.
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Endnotes
i From http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/pensions/table7-9.xls accessed 22-9-10
ii All based on http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/junebudget_diagrams.htm
iii The number of people of state pensionable age is projected to increase by 7.2 per cent from 11.3 million in2006 to 12.2 million in 2010. Allowing for the change in women's state pension age between 2010 and 2020,the population of pensionable age will then rise more slowly, reaching 12.7 million by 2020. A faster increasewill then resume, albeit one now expected to be tempered by the increase in state pension age for both sexesfrom 65 to 66, but with the number over pensionable age still likely to reach almost 15 million by 2031http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/pproj1007.pdf
iv Whilst the sums they control appear vast, amounting to £915bn in March 2010 according to the PensionProtection Fund the liabilities they owed at that date were of equal amount, and it was to very large degreepure luck that this was a massive improvement on the situation a year before when the stock market crashmeant there had been a 22% overall deficit in the UK’s pensions funds – totaling £242 bn in all. Any futurevolatility in share values will return those funds to periods of deficit again.http://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/pm/articles/2010/04/private-sector-pension-schemes-back-into-aggregate-surplus.htm
v This could be said to be the whole argument for the Turner Report. It could also be summarised as the wholereason why its implementation has been so difficult. And it is the reason for increasing g the state retirementage. See, for example, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/apr/04/politics.turnerreport andhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/jun/24/state-pension-age-rise-66
vi See for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/7858853/Women-over-50-not-saving-enough-for-pension.html
vii Turner Report quoted in Brummer, A ‘The Great pensions Robbery’, page 151
viii For more information on current plans, which may be subject to change, seehttp://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/money/pensions/article6981820.ece
ix See for example http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/channels/Finance/Article/1026256/Actuaries-warn-unaffordable-compulsory-pensions-bill/
x Data on this issue is noted by David Willets in his book ‘The Pinch’ e.g. page 240.
Additionally note that it is now 65 years since the end of World War 2. Those born soon afterservicemen and women returned from that war are now retiring and for the next twenty yearspeople will be retiring in greater numbers than ever before. The result is that the number of peopleof state pensionable age is projected to increase by 7.2 per cent from 11.3 million in 2006 to 12.2million in 2010. Allowing for the change in women's state pension age between 2010 and 2020, thepopulation of pensionable age will then rise more slowly, reaching 12.7 million by 2020. A fasterincrease will then resume, albeit one now expected to be tempered by the increase in state pension
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age for both sexes from 65 to 66, but with the number over pensionable age still likely to reachalmost 15 million by 2031. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/pproj1007.pdf
xi See for example http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/7812458/Benefits-and-pensions-targeted-to-cut-deficit.html
xii For the latest twist in this sorry tale see http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/sep/06/equitable-life-last-ditch-compensation-call
xiii See Alex Brummer, ‘The Great Pensions Robbery’ Chapter 3
xiv David Willets and Alex Brummer both discuss this extensively in books already noted, above.
xv http://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/pm/articles/2010/04/private-sector-pension-schemes-back-into-aggregate-surplus.htm
xvi http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1283
xvii http://www.nationwide.co.uk/hpi/historical/Jul_2010.pdf
xviii http://www.thecityuk.com/media/182038/equity%20markets%202010.pdf
xix http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/pensiontrends/Pension_Trends_ch09.pdf
xx http://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/pm/articles/2010/04/private-sector-pension-schemes-back-into-aggregate-surplus.htmxxi All based on http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/junebudget_diagrams.htm
xxii http://ftalphaville.ft.com/thecut/2010/02/12/147791/bt-dives-on-pension-deficit-disclosure/
xxiii http://www.neweconomics.org/publications/peoples-pensions
xxiv http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_thrift
xxv http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1011/hc02/0296/0296.pdf note 15
xxvi http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1011/hc02/0296/0296.pdf page 49
xxvii HM treasury budget data
xxviii HM Treasury
xxix http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/report-2007-08.pdf note 16a
xxx http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/income_distribution/3-6table-jan2010.pdf
xxxi http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_compendia/pensiontrends/Pension_Trends_ch09.pdf
xxxii http://www.nao.org.uk/idoc.ashx?docId=2fadc187-720d-49a0-a290-442e7e67454e&version=-1
xxxiii ibid
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xxxiv http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1283
xxxv http://www.tuc.org.uk/pensions/tuc-16929-f0.cfm. Note the ratio is more than 40% because of thecombination of income tax, corporation tax and national insurance reliefs.
xxxvi http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/pensions/table7-9.pdf
